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1 Introduction
 
 
 
1
Comity amongst nations has been an ideal, if difficult to achieve, particularly so 
in insolvency matters. That said, the judges in the common law have had to 
face the issues raised in the context of cross-border insolvencies, especially 
those of traders, from an early time. There is a considerable literature devoted 
to the phenomenon of international insolvency, initiated largely by the 
consequences of globalisation and the (inevitable) economic meltdown caused 
by the convergence of markets and economic cycles. An idea of the scale of 
this phenomenon, and its ensuing importance, can be gauged from the identity 
of those businesses established at the global level that have experienced 
insolvencies, including Barings, Bank of Credit and Commerce International, 
Maxwell Communications, Olympia and York, Enron, World.Com and Parmalat, 
some of which have had a presence in Malaysia and Singapore, the two 
countries that are the subject of this article. The reason for the focus on these 
countries, which, although now separate nations within the Commonwealth, are 
two jurisdictions with a shared legal and political history, is two-fold. Firstly, they 
are countries that are midway on the stage between developing and developed, 
their economies being advanced in comparison with some of their neighbours. 
Secondly, as members of the common law family, they exhibit a history of 
involvement in the phenomenon of international insolvency and measures 
assisting co-operation in insolvency that may serve as an example to those 
considering developments in this field. Furthermore, as members of the 
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1  The genesis of this paper comes from research initially explored in two articles first 
published as “Co-operation in International Insolvencies” in Omar 1996 MalLJ i and Omar 
1998 MalLJ cxxi. 
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Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), both Malaysia and 
Singapore are integrated in a regional framework that is growing in importance 
in trade terms globally, a fact that may itself militate for closer attention to be 
paid in the jurisdictions themselves to the phenomenon of cross-border 
insolvency. By way of note, this article deals predominantly with cross-border 
insolvency in the corporate context, although references to bankruptcy 
(personal insolvency) will be made where appropriate. 
 
 
2 Preliminary issues 
In order to understand the references below to the law of Commonwealth 
nations apart from Malaysia and Singapore, it is necessary to first understand 
the place of these two countries within the common law family and to 
appreciate how their domestic insolvency laws, both substantive and 
procedural, have been affected by developments within that family. 
 
 
2.1 The place of Malaysia and Singapore within common law nations 
The history of both Malaysia and Singapore is tied to the expansion of the 
British East India Company, which established a presence on the island of 
Penang (then named the Prince of Wales Island) in 1786. Settlements in 
Malacca and Singapore followed in 1824 and 1826 respectively, the three 
territories being united as the Straits Settlements Colony in 1826, although 
administered from Calcutta. In 1867, the colony became a Crown Colony, 
administered locally, but answerable to the Colonial Office from London. 
Certain princely states on the Malayan Peninsula, which had entered into a 
relationship with the United Kingdom, were united as the Federated Malay 
States in 1895,2 while control over the four northern states (the Unfederated 
Malay States)3
                                            
2  Pahang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Selangor. 
3  Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu. 
 passed from Thailand under the Anglo-Siam Treaty 1909. The 
Malayan Union was formed from these three blocs in 1946 (with the exclusion 
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of Singapore) with the Federation of Malaya obtaining independence in 1957. 
Malaysia was formed in 1963 with the addition of other Crown Colonies, 
including Singapore, North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) and Sarawak. After 
political differences, Singapore seceded from the federation in 1965. Both 
countries are sovereign members of the United Nations as well as the 
Commonwealth. Although both their systems of government are rooted in 
parliamentary democracy, there are some differences in the identity of the 
Head of State, Malaysia’s being chosen by the Conference of Malay Rulers 
from its members to serve five years,4 while Singapore’s is a President elected 
to serve a term of six years.5
In terms of law, the legal history of the jurisdictions is as complex as their 
political antecedents. Charters of Justice dated 1807 and 1826 introduced 
English law into Penang, Malacca and Singapore, although magistrates in the 
Straits Settlements were given considerable latitude in adapting it to local 
needs.
 
 
6 The Civil Law Ordinance 1878 effected the formal introduction of 
English commercial law into Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak.7 The 
Malay States (Federated and Unfederated) applied indigenous law and custom, 
although a number of laws were introduced into the Federated Malay States, 
which were patterned on developments in British India, including the Criminal 
Procedure Code 1902 and the Penal Code 1905.8 The Civil Law Enactment 
1937 and the Civil Law (Extension) Ordinance 1951 effected the introduction of 
English common law and equity into the Malay States.9 In Sarawak and Sabah, 
statutory reception of English law was effected by the Law of Sarawak 
Ordinance 1928 (revised 1949) and Civil Law Ordinance 1938 (revised 1951) 
respectively.10 All of these enactments were subsumed into the Civil Law Act 
1956,11
                                            
4  Art 32, Malaysian Constitution. 
5  Art 17 and 20, Singapore Constitution. 
6  See Wu Malaysian Legal System 14-16. 
7  Ibid at 17. 
8  Ibid at 23-24. 
9  Ibid at 25. 
10  Ibid at 29-30. 
11  Act 67 of the Federal Statute Series. 
 which provides in section 3 for various terminal dates for reception of 
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English common law and equity.12 Section 6(1) of the same act provides that 
English commercial law will apply to the states in West Malaysia as of the 
commencement date of the act on 7 April 1956. Curiously, section 6(2) of the 
act goes on to provide for continuing reception of commercial law, except 
where ousted by local law, in Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak, leading to 
the possibility that developments in the law of the United Kingdom may be 
applicable directly as part of the law in these states.13 In Singapore, the Charter 
of Justice 1826 effected the introduction of English common law and equitable 
principles on 27 November 1826 subject to the existence of local laws and 
insofar as their application was not repugnant to local custom or conditions.14 
Apart from this general reception, section 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956 provided 
for continuing reception of English commercial law.15 Nonetheless, post-
independence, in light of some uncertainty as to what English law was thus 
being imported, the Application of English Law Act 1993 restated the adoption 
date for common law and equity as at 12 November 1993 with a limited number 
of statutes being expressly extended in the First Schedule, all others being 
declared not to form part of the law of Singapore.16
2.2 Insolvency procedures in Malaysia and Singapore 
 That said, in relation to all 
the jurisdictions noted, English case law continues to have the status of 
persuasive precedent and the adoption locally of principles and rules developed 
elsewhere in the common law family of nations continues to occur. 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that company and insolvency law is commercial law par 
excellence, statutory developments in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the 
common law world have influenced statutory developments in Malaysia and 
                                            
12  Wu supra n 6 at 99-102. The dates aRe 12 December 1949 (Sarawak), 1 December 1951 
(Sabah) and 7 April 1956 (all states in West Malaysia). For Sarawak and Sabah, statutes 
of general application are also deemed to be received, while certain UK enactments 
expressly mentioned in the Second Schedule apply to Sarawak. 
13  Ibid at 106-111. 
14  Yeap Cheah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381. 
15  Cap 43 of the Statutes of Singapore (1988 rev ed), this section now repealed. See Chang 
http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/ 31 Aug at 6. 
16  Cap 7A of the Statutes of Singapore (1993 rev ed). See Chang supra n 15 at 7-8. 
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Singapore.17 In fact, one of the by-products of the Victorian codification 
experiment in commercial law was the extension of legislation to the Imperial 
possessions, whether expressly or as “statutes of general application”.18 Thus, 
the first company law statute to be applied in the Straits Settlements was the 
Indian Companies Ordinance 1866, which was replaced by a local ordinance in 
1889, itself replaced by successor legislation in 1915, 1923 and 1940. The 
Federated Malay States applied a Companies Enactment 1897, replaced in 
1917. Similar laws were made applicable in each of the Unfederated Malay 
States as local enactments. The various drafts of these ordinances and 
enactments generally reflected the model of English company law statutes 
prevailing at the time. The formation of the Malayan Union saw the extension of 
the Straits Settlements regime to the Malay States, which was maintained after 
Malayan independence in 1957 and the formation of Malaysia in 1963. 
Although West Malaysia and Singapore thus had the same law, the addition of 
two new statutes in the shape of the Sabah and Sarawak equivalents, the 
Companies Ordinances 1950 and 1956 respectively, prompted the Government 
to form a committee to consider the introduction of a single unified act. The 
influences behind what became the Companies Act 196519 were the United 
Kingdom Companies Act 1948, the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 
and the Ghanaian Companies Code drafted by Professor Gower in 1963.20 
Although Singapore had left the Federation by the time the act came into force, 
the Singapore Companies Act 1967 was identical in most respects to the 
Malaysian legislation.21
Given the similarity between the Acts and their relationship to statutory 
developments in other common law jurisdictions, it is not surprising, therefore, 
with regard to corporate insolvency, the relevant Companies Acts outline two 
basic types of insolvency measures that will be familiar to readers in the 
common law world. In the first case, creditors are able to appoint a receiver and 
  
 
                                            
17  See CCM http://www.ssm.com.my/clrc/cd1.pdf 31 Aug at 12. 
18  See Roberts-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law 554-555. 
19  Act 125 of the Federal Statute Series (hereafter CAM). 
20  CCM supra n 17 at 13. 
21  Cap 50 of the Statutes of Singapore (2006 rev ed) (hereafter CAS); Woon Company Law 
at 4. 
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manager in respect of the debtor company.22 Furthermore, an application may 
be made to court for the commencement of winding-up proceedings, which may 
be further subdivided into three types: members’ voluntary winding-up, 
creditors’ voluntary winding-up and winding-up by the court.23 Apart from the 
two insolvency-related measures, general company law offers to a company 
the possibility of entering into a scheme of arrangement for the reconstruction 
of its finances.24 In Singapore, the list of available procedures has been 
supplemented by the addition of judicial management, based on its British 
counterpart of administration.25 Judicial management is a procedure principally 
applicable to locally incorporated companies in a situation of imminent or 
technical insolvency and whose primary purpose is to avoid the inevitable 
consequences of winding-up, which are the liquidation of assets, destruction of 
viability and consequent loss of employment. In Malaysia, the passing of the 
Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 587 of 1998 has resulted in a 
further procedure allowing for the special administration of financially distressed 
companies through the management of non-performing loans, in effect a form 
of state-sponsored insolvency proceedings.26 Finally, also of a similar genesis 
to the corporate provisions, the bankruptcy model springs directly from the 
United Kingdom Bankruptcy Act 1883 and its successor consolidation statute, 
the Bankruptcy Act 1914, which were exported to a number of Commonwealth 
countries,27 including the Straits Settlements in 1888.28 The Bankruptcy 
Ordinance of the States of Malaya, the Bankruptcy Ordinance of Sarawak29
                                            
22  Part VIII, CAM and CAS. 
23  Part X, CAM and CAS. 
24  Part VII, CAM and CAS. 
25  Part VIIIA, CAS (which resembles the administration regime prior to the amendments 
introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK)). 
 and 
26  For the workings of this act, see Bidin 2004 ICCLR 344. It is noteworthy that the Malaysian 
Government has now suspended the operations of the Danaharta Company. See 
Danaharta Final Report http://www.danaharta.com.my 31 Aug. 
27  See Markham Victorian Insolvency 295-296 for a list of colonies and territories to which 
the acts were extended. 
28  Incorporated in 1965 as Cap 20 of the Statutes of Singapore (2000 rev ed) (hereafter 
BAS), although considerably amended by the Bankruptcy Act 15 of 1995. 
29  Sarawak Cap 46. 
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the Insolvency Ordinance of Sabah,30 all substantially similar in scope to the 
Straits Settlements legislation, were all merged in the Malaysian Act in 1967.31
3 The common law position 
 
 
 
3.1 Recognition of judgments 
It is a general principle of law that the law of the state of incorporation of the 
company governs its status from creation to dissolution.32 This is irrespective of 
the fact that the company may well operate principally or exclusively in another 
jurisdiction. The general principle stated here is recognised by the courts of 
Malaysia and Singapore.33 The extension of this principle would also require 
recognition of a foreign liquidation order that has been granted in the home 
jurisdiction, or domicile, of the company. This also includes recognition of the 
authority of a liquidator appointed by virtue of any order.34 In addition, orders 
pronounced by other jurisdictions may also be recognised provided the basis of 
jurisdiction approximates to grounds normally accepted by the local court. This 
is subject to certain common law exceptions to recognition based on whether 
foreign proceedings are final in nature, whether they comply with perceived 
notions of natural justice, whether jurisdiction has been exercised validly and 
whether recognition would offend public order rules.35
                                            
30  Sabah Cap 62. 
31  Act 55, revised in 1988 and republished as Act 360 of the Federal Statute Series 
(hereafter BAM). This Act was also the subject of amendments in the Bankruptcy 
(Amendment) Act 2003 (Act A1197). 
32  See North and Fawcett Private International Law at 897 (the chapter containing this quote 
was omitted from the later 1999 edition). 
33  Lazard v Midland Bank [1933] AC 283, cited as authority in Woon and Hicks Companies 
Act of Singapore at par 2:1301. It is submitted this principle is also valid for Malaysia. 
34  There is Australian authority to this effect: Re Alfred Shaw and Co (1897) QLJ 93. This 
accords with the principle outlined in Rule 178 in Collins et al (eds) Conflict of Laws 1150 
and, it is submitted, is also valid in Malaysia and Singapore. 
35  See Wood Principles of International Insolvency 250 at par 5-13. 
 One of the more 
problematic areas has been the position of foreign revenue claims in insolvency 
owing to judicial views that to allow collection of such claims would offend 
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public policy.36 This view has had to be relaxed in the United Kingdom for 
proceedings taking place under the European Insolvency Regulation,37 which 
does not distinguish between claims made by private or public bodies, and 
there is some support for a change in this position elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth.38
The traditional common law doctrine is that a foreign order, although creating 
an obligation that is actionable within the jurisdiction, cannot be enforced 
without the institution of fresh legal proceedings.
 
 
39 This is said to be on grounds 
that courts recognise the limitation of their own power, if making an order in 
similar circumstances, to affect assets of a company abroad without the 
express consent of the foreign court to initiate and assist proceedings. In this 
connection, it has been stated that the proposed winding-up in Singapore of a 
company incorporated in Malaysia would normally only affect assets within the 
jurisdiction of the court making the order and could not by its nature have full 
force and effect throughout Malaysia.40 Recognition is thus not tantamount to 
enforcement of the foreign order within the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is stated 
by commentators that, although a foreign liquidation order is not directly 
enforceable, it is assisted by the recognition of the appointment of the foreign 
liquidator and allowing him capacity to act in certain instances.41 Nevertheless, 
the exercise of this capacity to act may be limited as it has been held that 
powers available to a liquidator, including those to require examination of a 
company’s directors, are not available to a foreign liquidator, where no 
proceedings were opened in Singapore in respect of the foreign company.42
3.2 Exercise of domestic jurisdiction 
 
 
 
                                            
36  Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491. See Miller JG “Bankruptcy and Foreign 
Revenue Claims” (1991) JBL 144. For an interesting view contra, see Dawson K “An 
Extraterritorial Dichotomy?” [2000] 2 Insolv L 81, 83-85. 
37  Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 29 May 2000. 
38  Radich v Bank of New Zealand (1993) 116 ALR 676. 
39  North and Fawcett supra n 32 at 407 (13th ed). 
40  Tong Aik (Far East) v Eastern Minerals Trading (1959) [1965] 2 MLJ 149. 
41  See Cooper  and Jarvis (eds) Cross-Border Insolvency 7 (Australia) and 103 (Singapore). 
42  Re China Underwriters Life and General Insurance [1988] 1 MLJ 409. 
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The recognition of the subjection of a foreign company to a foreign law does not 
necessarily mean the domestic courts will not assume some jurisdiction over 
the issues in contention.43 What is clear is that the courts have had to take 
account of the existence of companies operating within the jurisdiction that 
have subsequently become insolvent. The nature of these proceedings is 
described as ancillary to main proceedings being undertaken in the home 
jurisdiction of the company. The case law developed in response to the growing 
problem of insolvencies of institutions with operations in the United Kingdom 
and the Dominions. In Re Matheson,44
does not take away the rights of a court of this country to make a 
winding-up order here, though it would no doubt exercise an 
influence upon this court...
 which concerned a winding-up petition 
presented by a creditor against a company already in liquidation in New 
Zealand, the proposition was stated that a foreign order –  
 
45
The affirmation of this jurisdiction was prompted by the need to secure assets 
in England to protect the rights of creditors and third parties present within the 
jurisdiction. In Re Commercial Bank of South Australia,
 
 
46 on the suspension of 
a bank incorporated in South Australia followed by a winding-up order, the 
creditors were held entitled to a winding-up order in England, the nature of 
which was described by the judge as being as ancillary to the winding-up in 
Australia.47
                                            
43  See s 4(1), CAM which reads: “In this Act, ... 'foreign company' means - (a) a company, 
corporation, society, association or other body incorporated outside Malaysia; or (b) an 
unincorporated society, association or other body which under the law of its place of origin 
may sue or be sued or hold property in the name of the secretary or other officer of the 
body or association duly appointed for that purpose and which does not have its head 
office or principal place of business in Malaysia;....”. The definition provided in s 4, CAS is 
similar. The definition of an 'oversea company' in s 744, Companies Act 1985 (UK) 
requires that a company incorporated elsewhere has a place of business within the UK for 
the purposes of Part XXIII of that act, while s 1044 and 1046, Companies Act 2006 (UK) 
now require that registration take place if the company establishes a presence in the UK. 
44  Re Matheson Brothers (1884) 27 Ch D 225. 
45  At 230 (per Mr Justice Kay). 
46  Re Commercial Bank of South Australia (1886) 33 Ch D 174. 
47  At 178 (The judge continues to state that care would be taken to ensure there would be no 
conflict between the courts and that costs would be kept down while the interests of all 
creditors would be looked after). 
 The extension of this jurisdiction involves determining the precise 
application of provisions of company legislation to foreign companies. In Re 
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Mercantile Bank of Australia48 the power to appoint a receiver49 and to require 
security to be given by a liquidator50 was held applicable to a company 
incorporated in Victoria but conducting business in London, where an ancillary 
order was stated as desirable though postponed till the outcome of shareholder 
negotiations in Australia was known. The relationship of various classes of 
creditors standing to gain or lose by the winding-up process may influence the 
decision of a court as is seen in the case of Re English, Scottish and Australian 
Chartered Bank,51 in which a company incorporated in England, whose 
principal business was in Australia, was due to be wound up in England. A 
scheme of reconstruction was proposed needing the assent of a meeting of the 
creditors and shareholders. Proxies were obtained from Australian creditors for 
a meeting in London, at which the resolutions were carried, subsequently 
sanctioned by order of court. British creditors appealed stating that, but for the 
Australian proxies, the scheme would not have met with the approval of British 
creditors. It was held that as there was nothing unreasonable or unfair in the 
scheme as between different classes of creditors, the expressed majority 
opinion should prevail. The general principle was stated that the courts of the 
country of domicile should act as the principal court, while “other courts act as 
ancillary... to the principal liquidation".52
Courts are normally keen to ensure that the priorities between proceedings in 
different jurisdictions are firmly set to ensure that any disparity in rights 
available to creditors acting in different jurisdictions do not affect the overall 
settlement of the liquidation. Thus, a court may grant the enforcement of rights 
acquired in priority to insolvency proceedings beginning,
 
 
53
                                            
48  Re Mercantile Bank of Australia [1892] 2 Ch 204. 
49  S 4, Companies (Winding-Up) Act 1890 (UK). See also s 135, Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 
231, CAM. 
50  Rule 67, Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1890 (UK). See rule 4.28, Insolvency Rules 1986 
(UK) and rule 47, Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1972 (Malaysia). 
51  Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385. 
52  At 394 (per Mr Justice Vaughan Williams). 
53  Galbraith v Grimshaw [1910] AC 508, in which a garnishee order obtained by judgment 
creditor was held to have priority over the sequestration of the judgment debtor’s assets. 
 though any disparity 
in the treatment of creditors may prompt the court to restrain one class of 
creditor from exercising rights available in another jurisdiction, as in the case of 
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Re Vocalion,54
…foreign creditors ... can not be restrained from taking such 
proceedings ... in their own country; ... the only result of such an 
injunction ... may be to benefit other foreign creditors without in any 
way increasing the amount of the assets ... distributable in the 
liquidation in this country.
 where a company registered in England was also registered in 
Victoria as a foreign company. The Bank of New South Wales claimed a sum 
owing for commission on banking work as well as for sums lent to the company 
and, in a separate action, for specific performance by the company and its 
registered agent in Victoria, of an undertaking by the agent to give security for 
the company to the bank, both of which actions were before the courts of 
Victoria. On the liquidation of the company in England, the Official Receiver 
sought an order restraining the bank from proceeding with its action in Victoria. 
It was held in that case that a court may in the exercise of its equitable 
jurisdiction restrain a party from proceeding with an action on liability incurred 
abroad brought in a foreign court. Where a company is domiciled abroad by 
registration as a foreign company, substantial justice is more likely to be 
attained by allowing the foreign proceedings to continue. In fact, as the trial 
judge stated:  
 
55
The costs of an ancillary liquidation may well amount to the equivalent of a full 
liquidation, particularly if decisions of liquidators are contested in several 
jurisdictions. The increase in costs is a factor that often motivates courts in 
deciding whether to permit further litigation as, from a practical standpoint, the 
result can only be to the detriment of creditors. The discretion to permit 
proceedings is also influenced by the just merits of the creditors’ claims and the 
unfair result on their position especially where the company concerned, as in 
the case of Re Suidair,
 
 
56
                                            
54  Re Vocalion (Foreign) Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 196. 
55  At 205 (per Mr Justice Maugham). 
56  Re Suidair International Airways Ltd [1951] 1 Ch 165. 
 had acted to the detriment of creditors in one 
jurisdiction. The case involved a company incorporated in South Africa with an 
office in London, which defaulted on payments for goods sold by an English 
creditor, whereupon the latter commenced proceedings and obtained judgment 
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in default. At the same time, a winding-up petition was presented by a creditor 
in South Africa and a provisional liquidator appointed. On discovering this, the 
English creditor issued writs of fieri facias on goods of the company. The South 
African liquidation being final, the liquidator claimed the goods, at which point 
another creditor in England also presented a winding-up petition. The first 
English creditor sought the benefit of their judgment against the liquidator in 
England. It was held that it was entitled to benefit from the judgment obtained, 
which but for the conduct of the company, in allowing other creditors to come 
in, would already have been met. The rule stated in Re English, Scottish and 
Australian Chartered Bank57
The ability of foreign liquidators to operate in the ancillary jurisdiction is of 
considerable advantage but not without some degree of difficulty.
did not mean that an ancillary winding-up would be 
decided by rules of the main procedure, under which the South African 
liquidator would have been entitled to the assets in England at the expense of 
the creditor, nor did it mean that the ancillary jurisdiction would be bound to 
give effect to decisions of the other court on points of law or procedure. 
 
58 Apart from 
the question of recognition of the liquidator’s qualification to act, there is the 
question of the degree of responsibility the liquidator may owe to the court in 
the main jurisdiction, which may lead to conflict between courts exercising 
jurisdiction in the same insolvency. This subject was treated in the case of 
Schemmer,59
                                            
57  Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385. 
58  See s 340(2)(b), CAM which reads: s 340(2) “If a foreign company goes into liquidation or 
is dissolved in its place of incorporation or origin-...(b) the liquidator shall, until a liquidator 
for Malaysia is duly appointed by the court, have the powers and functions of a liquidator 
for Malaysia.” Though this section does not expressly prohibit the appointment of a foreign 
liquidator to act in Malaysia, s 340(3)(c) on the satisfaction of Malaysian debts in priority 
before any excess is transferred for the benefit of foreign proceedings makes it highly 
unlikely a court would sanction such an appointment in what is clearly a situation of conflict 
of interest. See also s 377(2)(b) and s 377(3)(c), CAS. 
59  Schemmer and Others v Property Resources Ltd and Others [1975] 1 Ch 273. 
 where in the course of an investigation by the United States 
Securities Exchange Commission into the affairs of a company incorporated in 
the Bahamas, an action was brought in the Federal District Court in the 
Southern District of New York which resulted in the appointment of a receiver 
over assets, including the shares and assets of another company (also a 
Bahamian company) and its subsidiaries, controlled for the most part by the 
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first company. The receiver sought to be appointed receiver of the company 
and its subsidiaries in the United Kingdom and requested injunctions against 
three banks holding money for the company. The company then applied for the 
discharge of the order granting leave to serve the writ. 
 
It was held that before the English courts would recognise the title of a foreign 
receiver to assets in the jurisdiction or direct the establishment of ancillary 
receivership proceedings, the courts would have to be satisfied of the nexus 
between the defendant companies and the jurisdiction in which the receiver 
was appointed. Had the receiver been appointed in the Bahamas, there might 
have been a sufficient connection. A particular result of the development of 
case law in this field is that the courts have not been slow to entertain the 
institution of ancillary proceedings where these are appropriate. The question of 
whether the ancillary jurisdiction may take a lead in the proceedings is one that 
has often been put, especially where the connection of the foreign company is 
greater with the ancillary jurisdiction. A recent example in the United Kingdom 
is the case of Re A Company (1987),60
The precise role to be played by the ancillary jurisdiction in cases where 
proceedings were at an advance stage in the main jurisdiction is often a point of 
 in which a company registered in 
Liberia, operated mainly through London shipping agents. It defaulted on 
payments due under an agreement for the construction of a vessel subject to a 
mortgage given to International Westminster Bank. The bank declared the 
whole indebtedness to be due under the loan agreement and obtained 
judgment for the amount. The bank subsequently presented a petition for the 
winding-up of the company. For a court to make a winding-up order against a 
foreign corporation, it was held not necessary to show that the company had 
assets within the jurisdiction but that there was a close link with the jurisdiction, 
which on the facts: company management, bank accounts and main business 
situated within the jurisdiction, made the courts in England the most appropriate 
to deal with the matter. As there was conceivably an advantage to the creditors 
in having a winding-up in England, an order would be made. 
 
                                            
60  Re A Company (No 00359 of 1987) [1988] 1 Ch 210. 
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contention between the courts. It may be that the ancillary jurisdiction would 
prefer a winding-up to be instituted while the main jurisdiction has in mind 
preservation proceedings, enabling the company to continue its operations in a 
restricted form, with appropriate court supervision. These issues were the 
subject of the leading case of Felixstowe,61 where United States Lines, a 
company incorporated in the United States, was registered as an oversea 
company in England. It entered a moratorium on payments under American 
bankruptcy law.62 Felixstowe and other plaintiffs instituted actions on debts 
owed in England by the American company and obtained Mareva injunctions,63 
the effect of which was to require the company to retain sufficient assets within 
the jurisdiction to meet any judgments against them. The American company, 
which wanted to hive down its operations in Europe applied to have the 
injunctions set aside, arguing that an English court should recognise the 
procedures being followed in the United States, under which a restraining order 
had been granted against any suit outside the United States. The maintenance 
of the injunction would serve to prevent administration according to United 
States procedures by a United States court and would have the effect of 
granting the plaintiffs priority over other creditors. The proper approach of an 
English court was to regard the courts of the country of incorporation as the 
appropriate legal forum for controlling the winding-up of that company. Where 
that company had assets in England, the normal procedure was to carry out an 
ancillary winding-up in harmony with the main court. However, a United States 
restraining order that required assets to be moved outside the jurisdiction could 
have no effect in England on an English court. It was noted that, as the English 
practice was in harmony with certain provisions of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code,64
                                            
61  Felixstowe Dock and Railway v United States Lines [1988] 2 All ER 77. 
62  Ch 11, US Bankruptcy Code (11 USC s 1101-1174). 
63  Named after the case of Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA, 
The Mareva [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509. 
64  S 304, US Bankruptcy Code (11 USC s 304). See Re Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Bkrtcy 
25 BR 621 (1982), Interpool v KKL 102 BR 373 (1988) and Lindner Fund v Polly Peck 
International PLC 143 BR 807 (1992). 
 and, on the balance of convenience test, the American company 
suffered no material prejudice as the assets remained preserved with no 
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garnishee orders being permitted, the injunctions would be continued. The 
judge noted:  
 
…the English practice is to regard the courts of the country of 
incorporation as the appropriate legal forum for controlling the 
winding-up of a company but that, insofar as that company had 
assets here, the usual practice is to carry out an ancillary winding-up 
in accordance with our own rules, while working in harmony with the 
foreign courts.65
The case-law makes it clear that the courts retain a substantial discretion, 
particularly over whether to permit ancillary winding-up proceedings as in the 
case of Re Wallace Smith Group.
 
 
66 The company in question was an 
authorised institution under the Banking Act 1987 which had been wound up on 
the application of the Bank of England. Further to this, four other companies, all 
members of the same group of companies, were the subject of winding-up 
petitions by the liquidators of the company. The petition relating to another 
company alleged substantial indebtedness in relation to the employment of two 
persons attributable in the inter-company accounts to that company. On the 
facts, the petition would be dismissed as to allow it would prejudice concurrent 
proceedings on the same issue in the Ontario courts. It is not the case that 
once indebtedness is shown, together with a connection with the jurisdiction 
and the possibility of benefit to creditors within the jurisdiction, that an ancillary 
winding-up order is automatic. The courts retained a discretion, one of the 
factors being whether there was a more appropriate jurisdiction for the claim.67 
In a similar context, it has also been held that where the connection with the 
ancillary jurisdiction was fortuitous and the transfer of assets to the main 
jurisdiction could be effected without substantial cost, no purpose would be 
served by the granting of an ancillary winding-up order.68
                                            
65  At 93-94 (per Mr Justice Hirst). 
66  Re Wallace Smith Group [1992] BCLC 989. 
67  Similarly in Re Wallace Smith [1992] BCLC 970 (If the connection with the ancillary 
jurisdiction was modest and the transfer of assets to the main jurisdiction could be effected 
without substantial cost, no purpose would be served by an ancillary winding-up order). 
See also Tong Aik (Far East) v Eastern Minerals and Trading (1959) [1965] 2 MLJ 149, 
where a Singapore court declined jurisdiction in favour of a Malaysian court. 
68  Re Wallace Smith [1992] BCLC 970. 
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The common law continues to develop rules to meet the inevitable challenges 
occasioned by the competing interests of the courts of several jurisdictions 
concerned with the activities of the same insolvent company. However, these 
principles have to a greater or lesser extent been supplemented or supplanted 
by statutory provisions that are the subject of the following sections dealing with 
ancillary jurisdiction and co-operation measures. As will be seen, these 
common law principles continue to influence and dictate the extent of the 
judicial discretion that is exercised in the course of applying these statutory 
provisions and reflect views of whether courts themselves are keen to promote 
co-operation and assistance. Nonetheless, the common law continues to throw 
up cases that illustrate the willingness of courts to assist courts elsewhere 
where statutory provisions either do not exist or are limited in their scope. An 
interesting recent example is the case of Cambridge Gas,69 where bondholders 
of a group that had filed for Chapter 11 protection in the United States did not 
support the debtor’s reorganisation plan and sought successfully to substitute 
their own. Enforcement of the rival plan was then sought before the courts in 
the Isle of Man where the parent company was located. In granting the order for 
recognition, the Privy Council, although recognising that assistance to a foreign 
office-holder was narrower than the statutory position represented by provisions 
such as section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, nonetheless the common law 
position in favouring universality of bankruptcy militated for recognition of the 
plan and for assistance in furthering its enforceability.70
4 Statutory jurisdiction to wind up a foreign company 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A jurisdiction conferred by statute has long existed in the United Kingdom for 
the winding-up of unregistered companies, which definition may include foreign 
                                            
69  Cambridge Gas Transport Group Corp v The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holdings PLC [2006] UKPC 26. 
70  Walters 2007Co Law 73; Moss 2006 Insolv Int 123. 
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corporations.71 A jurisdiction conferred by statute has long existed in England 
and Wales for the winding-up of unregistered companies, which definition has 
also been held to include foreign corporations.72 An early inclusion in the Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1848 sought to define, by reference to the location of the 
registered place of business or head office, the allocation of jurisdiction 
between Irish and English courts over the winding-up of companies.73 A more 
sophisticated section in 1862 legislation saw the introduction of statutory 
authority for the winding-up of any unregistered company in the part or parts of 
Great Britain, meaning England and Wales or Scotland, where it has a principal 
place of business.74 This section was repeated in the 1908 consolidation.75 The 
application of this provision to companies in existence and operating within the 
jurisdiction was not in doubt, the definition of unregistered company including 
the foreign company by default.76 However, this was not thought to be the case 
where the company had ceased to exist in accordance with a regular judgment 
or process in its jurisdiction of origin. This issue arose in cases before the 
courts in England because of the consequences of the 1917 October 
Revolution, following which the nationalisation of all Russian banks was 
decreed. The effect on creditors in England became apparent in the 1920s as 
various suits against banks established in Moscow with operations in London 
were struck out as wanting.77
                                            
71  See s 32(3), Companies (Winding-Up) Act 1890 (UK) applying the act to companies 
without a registered office within the jurisdiction. See also Re Mercantile Bank of Australia 
[1892] 2 Ch 204. 
72  Re Commercial Bank of India (1868) LR 6 Eq 517. See also s 32(3), Companies (Winding-
Up) Act 1890 (UK) applying the act to companies without a registered office within the 
jurisdiction and Re Federal Bank of Australia (1893) 62 LJ Ch 56. 
73  S 117, Joint Stock Companies Act 1848 (UK). 
74  S 199, Companies Act 1862 (UK). 
75  S 268, Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (UK). 
76  Re Jarvis (1895) 11 TLR 373 (Missouri company); Re Syria Ottoman Railway Company 
(1904) 20 TLR 217 (Turkish company). This definition is wide and also includes the 
situation of Northern Irish companies operating in England as decided in Re A Company 
(No 007946 of 1993) [1994] 2 WLR 438. See Smart 1996 ICLQ 177. 
77  Lazard Brothers v Midland Bank [1933] AC 289 (Garnishee proceedings on assets in 
London of a bank dissolved in Russia held void on grounds of it ceasing to exist). 
 A provision was introduced into the United 
Kingdom Companies Act 1929, which subsequently has been incorporated in 
the Companies Acts of Malaysia and Singapore, to provide for the winding-up 
of an unregistered company, was extended to cover the situation where a 
company, which though operating within the jurisdiction through a branch or 
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other office, had been dissolved in its place of incorporation.78 Nevertheless, 
the operation of the provision was not without difficulty. It was not thought that it 
could extend to the situation where a company had ceased to exist before the 
passing of the act. Judicial intervention arrived in the shape of Russian and 
English Bank,79
…a necessary implication… that the dissolved foreign company is to 
be wound up as though it had not been dissolved and therefore 
continued in existence.
 which followed the situation where the Russian Ministry of 
Agriculture purchased seed from a Danish firm and requested the bank, 
incorporated in the form of a company in St Petersburg, to pay this sum through 
its London branch. Reimbursement was sought through payment, on Ministry of 
Finance instructions, by Barings to the bank. Barings failed to pay, prompting 
the bank to sue. It was discovered that the bank had been dissolved by Soviet 
legislation, and the suit was stayed for the commencement of winding-up 
proceedings. An action was then brought in the bank’s name against Barings, 
which the latter sought to have struck out on grounds that the bank was a 
dissolved corporation. It was held in the case that a foreign company may, 
notwithstanding its dissolution in its place of origin, be wound up as an 
unregistered company in England, when an action may be brought in its name 
to recover moneys due and unpaid at the time of its dissolution. Lord Atkin, one 
of the members of the panel, opined it:  
 
80
This extension of jurisdiction was confirmed in Re Russian Bank for Foreign 
Trade,
  
 
81
                                            
78  See s 338(2), Companies Act 1929 (UK) which reads: “Where a company incorporated 
outside Great Britain which has been carrying on business in Great Britain ceases to carry 
on business in Great Britain, it may be wound up as an unregistered company under this 
part of this Act, notwithstanding that it has been dissolved or otherwise ceased to exist as 
a company under or by virtue of the laws of the country in which it was incorporated.” See 
also s 315, CAM and s 351, CAS. 
79  Russian and English Bank v Baring Bros [1936] AC 405. 
80  At 427. 
81  Re Russian Bank for Foreign Trade [1933] 1 Ch 745. 
 which concluded that the impossibility of a branch continuing to 
function when its main office had ceased to exist according to its statutes of 
incorporation was ample reason to order a winding-up. The consequences of 
the Russian Revolution were to haunt the law reports for many years after. In 
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the case of Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschetsky),82 
proceedings under later companies legislation,83 the claims of various creditors 
were held subject to Russian law and that the revival of the company for the 
purposes of winding-up could not revive claims which were barred by the 
nationalisation decree. The situation of confiscatory legislation, which over the 
years was encountered in a number of different instances, has been generally 
held not to operate so as to remove those obligations that the company had 
acquired within the jurisdiction where proceedings were being instituted, 
whether this company was the subject of liquidation proceedings or 
proceedings for the enforcement of debt as is the case in Metliss,84
Part of the consideration for exercising jurisdiction has been to look at the 
nature of the obligations situated within the jurisdiction. In Re Compania 
Merabello
 where a 
Greek Decree 1949 enforced a moratorium on the National Mortgage Bank of 
Greece, which was subsequently dissolved in 1953 and amalgamated to form a 
new bank. The plaintiff sued this bank on certain bonds, disputes about which 
were expressed as being subject to arbitration in London according to English 
law. It was held that, although Greek law had to be examined to ascertain the 
nature of the juridical body being created by the decree, the succession of this 
body to obligations acquired by its predecessor and expressed as being subject 
to English law must be examined by principles of English law. In the instant 
case, the courts could not admit the bank’s status as a justiciable person 
without admitting its liability for acts entered into by its predecessor. 
 
85
                                            
82  Re Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschetsky) (Royal Exchange Assurance v 
Liquidator) [1952] 1 All ER 1269; Idem (Ouchkoff v Liquidator) [1954] 2 All ER 746. 
83  S 399, Companies Act 1948 (UK). 
84  Metliss v National Bank of Greece and Athens SA [1958] AC 509. 
85  Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas SA [1973] 1 Ch 75 (Claim in respect of a contract of 
carriage of cargo, subrogated by insurers, against a creditor of the company with view to 
vesting the claim under the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930). This line of 
reasoning is of some vintage and the presence of substantial assets was deemed a 
requirement in Tong Aik (Far East) v Eastern Minerals Trading (1959) [1965] 2 MLJ 149. 
 it was stated that normally a case falling under the Companies Act 
envisaged no need to establish that the company had a place of business or 
that it had carried out business in the jurisdiction, but required a connection with 
the jurisdiction and the presence of some assets of benefit to creditors. The 
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nature of these assets might be intangible, such as a right of action, the 
success of which need not be proved to obtain a winding-up order, as was the 
case in Re Allobrogia,86 or might even consist of a potential claim against a 
statutory scheme, as in Re Eloc.87 Courts would be careful to exercise their 
discretion widely in these cases where there was some tangible benefit and 
would not restrict any order made to fetter the actions of officials acting under 
the direction of the court.88 A further qualification on whether the presence of 
assets is even necessary was decided in the case of Okeanos,89 where the 
tangible benefit consisted of the connection of the company with the jurisdiction 
and the likelihood that the creditors would obtain some benefit from the 
winding-up being carried out in the jurisdiction.90 Nevertheless, the issue of 
benefit remains of importance and continues to govern the case law. It was 
reiterated and been summarised in the case of Real Estate Development,91 
where the requirements are for courts to determine the existence of a sufficient 
connection with the jurisdiction, a qualification that need not necessarily consist 
of assets, the existence of a reasonable prospect of benefit to those applying 
for the winding-up order and that one of the individuals concerned must be a 
person (natural or legal) over whom the court could take jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, there remains the question of the appropriate action to take in 
cases where the assets at first sight appear intangible. In fact, the case of Re 
Latreefers92 is treated as authority for the proposition that even the summary of 
the jurisdictional requirements in Real Estate Development are not to be treated 
as preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction.93
                                            
86  Re Allobrogia Steamship Corporation [1978] 3 All ER 425 (Claim by owners of a cargo 
against A resulting from a contract of carriage, insured in the United Kingdom. Potential to 
sue for recovery of sum assured held to be a sufficient asset to found winding-up 
procedure). 
87  Re Eloc Electro-Optieck and Communicatie BV [1982] 1 Ch 43 (Possibility of payment 
from statutory fund for employee redundancy contingent on company being wound up held 
sufficient benefit for order to be made). 
88  Re Hibernian Merchants [1957] 3 All ER 97. 
89  International Westminster Bank PLC v Okeanos Maritime Corp [1987] BCLC 450. 
90  See Dine 1988 Co Law 30. 
91  Real Estate Development [1991] BCLC 210. 
92  Re Latreefers [1999] 1 BCLC 271, on appeal sub nom Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latreefers 
[2000] EWCA Civ 36 (9 February 2000). See Dawson 1999 Co Law 304. 
93  See par 30 of the judgment. 
 In line with the general move 
towards looking at the benefit to creditors rather than the preponderance of 
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assets, courts in Singapore have also wound up foreign companies where there 
is in fact a “sufficient connection” with Singapore and there is a “reasonable 
possibility of benefit” that may accrue to creditors in proceedings.94 
Nevertheless, it is still the case courts will not accede to an order for ancillary 
liquidation, where there is doubt as to whether substantial assets located in the 
jurisdiction do in fact have a connection to the company in question and that 
proceedings already in progress in the company’s home jurisdiction would be 
competent to determine this question.95
4.2 Provisions for exercising jurisdiction 
 
 
 
The law relating to insolvency, contained in the Companies Acts of Malaysia 
and Singapore, is derived in part from the Australian Uniform Companies Act 
1961, itself re-codified in 1981, 1989 and again in 2001.96 In parallel with the 
Australian legislation, both the Malaysian and Singapore Acts contain two 
separate sets of provisions dealing with jurisdiction over a foreign company, the 
first where that company has registered to conduct business within the 
jurisdiction and second, if a company falls outside the foregoing provisions, 
where it falls within the definition of an unregistered company. This second 
provision was originally introduced into the United Kingdom Companies Act 
1929, which influenced the Australian legislation and subsequently became 
incorporated in the Companies Acts of Malaysia and Singapore, to provide for 
the winding-up of an unregistered company. This provision was later extended 
to cover the situation where a company had been dissolved in its place of 
incorporation.97
                                            
94  See Lee 
 
 
http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/ 31 Aug, citing Re Griffin Securities 
Corporation [1999] 3 SLR 346. 
95  New Hampshire Insurance Co v Rush and Tompkins Group PLC and another [1998] 2 
BCLC 471. 
96  In the Companies Code 1981, the Corporations Act 1989, retitled Corporations Law by the 
Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1990, and the Corporations Act 2001 (hereafter 
CAA). 
97  S 338(2), Companies Act 1929 (UK). See s 315, CAM and s 351, CAS. 
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4.2.1 Specific jurisdiction to wind up a foreign registered company 
The law provides that companies wishing to conduct business in Malaysia or 
Singapore must not carry out business in these countries unless they have 
been registered or are about to register with the appropriate authority.98 The 
law provides that where a registered foreign company goes into liquidation, or 
has been dissolved, in its home jurisdiction, any person who is a local agent of 
the foreign company must lodge notice of that fact and notice of the 
appointment of a liquidator, where one is appointed, within a time period of one 
month calculated by reference to the dissolution or the beginning of winding-up 
proceedings.99 The person who has been appointed liquidator in the foreign 
jurisdiction enjoys the powers of a local liquidator until one is appointed by 
court.100 Authority suggests that a foreign liquidator does not become the 
liquidator for Singapore merely because he is given the powers of this latter 
post.101
A liquidator of a foreign company appointed by the courts must invite all 
creditors to make their claims against the foreign company within a reasonable 
time before any distribution of the foreign company's property is made. This is 
usually performed by advertising in a daily newspaper circulating generally in 
any country where the foreign company has carried on business at any time 
prior to liquidation, except in any particular jurisdiction where a liquidator has in 
fact been appointed.
 This would suggest that appointment of a liquidator in Malaysia or 
Singapore would result in the revocation of any order vesting title to property in 
the foreign liquidator made by a local court. 
 
102
                                            
98  S 332, CAM; s 368, CAS. 
99  S 340(2)(a), CAM; s 377(2)(a), CAS; s 601CL(14)(a), CAA. In Australia, the courts have 
the power to entertain an application by the Securities Commission or the person who is 
the liquidator for the foreign company in its home jurisdiction to appoint a liquidator of the 
foreign company in Australia. This power is curiously absent from the draft of both the 
CAM and CAS. 
100  S 340(2)(b), CAM; s 377(2)(b), CAS; s 601CL(14)(b), CAA. 
101  Re China Underwriters Life and General Insurance [1988] 1 MLJ 409 at 413D (per Chan 
Sek Keong jc). Arguably, this analysis also holds true for the Malaysian provision. 
102  S 340(3)(a), CAM; s 377(3)(a), CAS; s 601CL(15)(a), CAA. In Australia, 6 years is the 
upper limit for ascertaining if a foreign company has conducted business in any particular 
state or territory. 
 In addition, the liquidator may not pay out a creditor of 
the foreign company to the exclusion of another creditor of the foreign company 
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without obtaining a court order authorising him to do so.103 Any payments that 
are made will be in accordance with domestic rules for the ranking and 
payment of claims.104 The liquidator is required to recover and realise all 
property belonging to the foreign company in Malaysia or Singapore and pay 
the net amount to the liquidator of the foreign company for its home jurisdiction 
unless the courts otherwise order. Nevertheless, this is subject to a local 'grab-
rule', by which the net amount is paid after paying any debts and satisfying any 
liabilities within the jurisdiction.105 Commentators are divided about the effect of 
local grab-rules, suggesting that this type of territorial approach runs counter to 
the accepted pari passu principle and equality of treatment. In international 
insolvency proceedings, it is argued that only very diligent creditors will be able 
to participate and prove in a number of insolvencies and smaller creditors, 
unless fortuitously present in the jurisdiction applying the grab-rule, will lose 
out. This results in an element of unpredictability in international business 
leading to increased transaction costs in financing and insurance 
arrangements. This view is echoed locally by Lee, who suggests that the grab-
rule is an “unsatisfactory feature” of the law in Singapore, which appears to be 
out of step with current international standards and the traditional position at 
common law, which normally accepts the pari passu principle, thus meriting 
consideration as part of possible reforms.106
There is authority to suggest that grounds for a court refusing to allow 
repatriation of assets may arise where, for example, there is a risk that the 
liquidator in the foreign company’s home jurisdiction might not divide assets 
equitably.
 
 
107
                                            
103  S 340(3)(b), CAM; s 377(3)(b), CAS; s 601CL(15)(b), CAA. 
104  S 292, CAM; s 328, CAS. 
105  S 340(3)(c), CAM; s 377(3)(c), CAS. See s 601CL(15)(c), CAA, which does not apply the 
grab-rule. 
106  Lee supra n 94 at 330-331, citing Tohru Motorbayashi v Official Receiver [2000] 4 SLR 
529. 
107  Re Australian Life and General Assurance Company [1931] VLR 317. 
 Where there is no liquidator for the home jurisdiction, the liquidator 
may apply to the Court for directions about the disposal of the net amount 
recovered following winding-up of the registered foreign company insofar as its 
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property in Malaysia or Singapore is concerned.108 Proceedings under the 
specific jurisdiction rule are generally treated as being ancillary to proceedings 
being conducted in the foreign company’s home jurisdiction.109 As the definition 
in the law uses the term 'place of incorporation or origin', it is submitted that 
where there is evidence that the company has closer attachments to another 
jurisdiction in which incorporation was not actually carried out, proceedings in 
that jurisdiction will be treated as primary proceedings, to which a liquidation in 
Singapore or Malaysia will be ancillary. Nevertheless, these rules may not be of 
application where there are no proceedings in the home jurisdiction or these 
proceedings fall short of what are considered liquidation proceedings. In 
addition, there is doubt that this provision applied in situations where the foreign 
company has not in fact registered to conduct business.110
4.2.2 The general jurisdiction rule 
 
 
Additional jurisdiction in Malaysia and Singapore to wind up a company not 
incorporated in these jurisdictions is available in Division 5 of Part X of the 
respective acts. These rules apply to what are termed 'unregistered 
companies', defined to include a foreign company and any partnership 
association or company consisting of more than five members, but not include 
a company incorporated under the act.111 The rules in this part are stated to be 
in addition to and do not supersede any provisions contained in the act or any 
other law dealing with the winding-up of companies. The same powers are, in 
fact, given to the courts or appointed liquidator to perform any act in the case of 
a company falling under these rules as is normally performed in respect of the 
winding-up of companies.112
                                            
108  S 340(4), CAM; s 377(4), CAS; s 601CL(16), CAA. 
109  Re Commercial Bank of South Australia (1886) 33 Ch D 174; Re English, Scottish and 
Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385. 
110  Cooper and Jarvis supra n 42 at 6 state that as a rule “where a foreign company is not 
registered in Australia, ancillary proceedings may not be commenced”. UK Tobacco (1929) 
v Malayan Tobacco Distributors [1933] MLJ 1 is authority to suggest that registration is an 
obligation, although failure to register does not make the company an illegal association or 
prevent it from enforcing any rights it may have. 
111  S 314(1), CAM; s 350(1), CAS. In Woon and Hicks supra n 33 at par  2:5734, it is pointed 
out at that the Singapore text inserts a comma between the words 'partnership' and 
'association', thus possibly changing the import of the provision. 
112 S 314(2), CAM; s 350(2), CAS; s 582(1), CAA. 
 As a general principle, an unregistered company 
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may be wound up notwithstanding that it is being wound up or has been 
dissolved or has otherwise ceased to exist as a company by virtue of the laws 
of the place where it was incorporated.113
An unregistered company may be wound up under Part X, which deals with 
winding-up in general, subject to certain necessary adaptations. These include, 
in relation to foreign companies, the fact that the principal place of business in 
Malaysia or Singapore for the purpose of winding-up is taken to be the 
registered office of the foreign company and that a foreign company may not be 
subject to voluntary winding-up.
 
 
114 Proof that a foreign company is in fact 
carrying on business in Malaysia or Singapore is to be inferred from the 
establishment of a share transfer or registration office or frequent dealings with 
property in the jurisdiction as an agent, legal personal representative or 
trustee.115 Activities which of themselves do not signify that the foreign 
company is carrying out business include acting as a party to legal 
proceedings, holding company meetings in Malaysia or Singapore, maintaining 
a bank account, effecting a sale through an independent contractor, creating 
security over property or debt, collecting or enforcing rights over debt, investing 
funds or holding property, procures the conclusion of contracts binding outside 
these countries and conducting a single or isolated transaction within a 31-day 
period, unless this transaction is one of a similar series conducted over a period 
of time.116 In addition, in Malaysia, the temporary importation of goods for a 
display or exhibition with view to re-export is not considered to amount to 
carrying on business.117
Circumstances in which an unregistered company may be wound up include 
where it is unable to pay its debts, where it has been dissolved, where it has 
ceased to carry on business in Malaysia or Singapore, where it has a place of 
business in these countries only for the purpose of winding-up its business and 
 
 
                                            
113  S 315(3), CAM; s 351(3), CAS; s 582(3), CAA. 
114  S 315(1)(a)-(b), CAM; s 351(1)(a)-(b), CAS; s 583(a)-(b), CAA. 
115  S 330(1), CAM; s 366(1), CAS. 
116 S 330(2), CAM; s 366(2), CAS. 
117  S 330(2)(j), CAM. 
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where the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that it should be 
wound up.118 Instances in which an unregistered company is deemed to be 
unable to pay its debts include where it fails to pay or otherwise secure or 
compound within three weeks following the presentation of a demand made by 
a creditor for payment of a sum in excess of the statutory set amount, where it 
fails to take steps upon the service of notice of an action or other proceedings 
by another party on either a shareholder or the company concerned by paying 
any debt due or taking steps to meet any demands which have been made, 
where execution or enforcement of a judgment obtained in any court has not 
been satisfied by the company and, lastly, where it is proved to the satisfaction 
of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts.119
Following dissolution of an unregistered company, where any property 
belonging to that body remains in Malaysia or Singapore, the legal or equitable 
estate or other interest in that property, together with any claim, right or remedy 
affecting that property will vest in the person entitled under the law of the 
company’s place of incorporation or origin.
  
 
120 Where the place of origin is 
Malaysia or Singapore, which may be the case of partnership associations or 
other types of company, local rules on the distribution of the assets of defunct 
companies will apply.121 An element of reciprocity is required for the operation 
of this section as the place of origin must be a country, designated by the 
Government Minister responsible as having laws containing provisions similar 
to those set out in these rules.122
4.2.3 Additional considerations for exercising jurisdiction 
 
 
As noted earlier, the development of common law principles for the exercise of 
jurisdiction over foreign companies has permeated the exercise of statutory 
                                            
118 S 315(1)(c), CAM; s 351(1)(c), CAS; s 583(c), CAA. 
119  S 315(2), CAM; s 351(2), CAS; s 585, CAA. 
120  S 318(1), CAM; s 354(1), CAS. 
121  S 318(2), CAM; s 354(2), CAS.  
122  S 318(3), CAM; s 354(3), CAS. See s 588, CAA, which provides that the property will vest 
in the Securities Commission, unless the part 5.7 body (broadly equivalent to the 
unregistered company) is incorporated in Australia, when it vests in the person entitled by 
the law of the body’s place of origin. 
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jurisdiction through the influence over judicial discretion. As will be seen below, 
three areas in particular have seen further development in this context. 
 
(a) Further jurisdictional requirements 
 
It is stated that the existence of a place of business in Singapore is not 
necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction to wind up an unregistered, or foreign, 
company. A winding-up order may be made as long as assets are present 
within the jurisdiction. As an alternative, there may be persons present within 
the jurisdiction who have a legitimate interest in the proper distribution of a 
company’s assets.123 A broad view is taken of the definition of assets, so as to 
include rights pertaining to a cause of action.124 This view is not universal in all 
common law jurisdictions. It may be instructive to note that commentators in 
Australia argue that it is necessary to show stronger evidence of a connection 
with the jurisdiction. Often, determining whether the evidence shows the type of 
connection necessary may be complex, as Australian case-law illustrates in Re 
Norfolk.125
                                            
123 Woon and Hicks supra n 33 at 2:5828, citing as authority Banque des Marchands de 
Moscou (Koupetschesky) v Kindersley [1951] Ch 112. 
124 Re Compania Merabello San Nicholas SA [1973] Ch 75; Re Allobrogia Steamship Corp. 
[1978] 3 All ER 423. 
125 Re Norfolk Shipping Line (1988) 6 ACLC 990. 
 A shipping company, incorporated on Norfolk Island, operated 
between Sydney and ports in New Zealand via Norfolk Island. Its sole asset, a 
ship, was stranded in Auckland. The company had not registered in New South 
Wales as a foreign company and did not have an office in New South Wales, its 
affairs being managed by an agent company, incorporated in that jurisdiction. In 
proceedings hearing a winding-up petition, the court considered whether it had 
jurisdiction and held that the domestic provisions clearly applied to foreign 
companies if these were subject to registration, which was required if the 
company wished to establish a place of business or carry out business in New 
South Wales. Although the company had no place of business or any office in 
the jurisdiction, the court formed the view that the company did in fact carry on 
business in New South Wales, which it based on the observation that the 
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company carried out, through its agent, more than a limited number of isolated 
transactions with view to pecuniary gain.  
 
On the question of the appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction, the court 
concluded that there must also be a proper commercial connection with the 
jurisdiction, defined to include the presence of assets and personnel within the 
jurisdiction competent to distribute the assets concerned, as well as a 
reasonable possibility that benefit would accrue to creditors from a winding-up 
order being obtained in that jurisdiction.126 The court could not establish the 
presence of any assets within the jurisdiction with any certainty and could not 
hold that creditors owed a total amount of more than a million dollars would 
benefit. The court thus had doubts as to whether the presumptions under the 
law were met but justified appointment of a provisional liquidator under other 
legislation.127 In the above case, the court opined that the law with respect to 
whether assets, whether these are negligible or not, are required as a basis of 
jurisdiction is not yet certain.128 There is further authority to suggest that a 
winding-up will only be ordered if there are assets present within the 
jurisdiction,129 although the New South Wales Supreme Court has in fact made 
an order in respect of an insolvent foreign company with negligible assets in 
Australia where almost all of the creditors were resident within the 
jurisdiction.130 The question of whether the existence of assets and concomitant 
benefit to creditors as grounds for jurisdiction is necessary has also been raised 
by commentators.131 This argument has also been raised in Singapore, where 
the trend has been to minimise the asset test and look instead to the potential 
benefit to creditors of proceedings.132
                                            
126 Following Re Compagnia Merabello San Nicholas SA [1973] Ch 75 and Re A Company 
(No 00359 of 1987) [1988] 1 Ch 210. 
127 Furthermore, in a related case: Re Atlantic Isle Shipping (1988) 6 ACLC 992, a provisional 
liquidator was appointed for a connected company on the basis of the presence of minimal 
assets and the bare minimum of evidence suggesting the company did in fact carry on 
business in New South Wales. 
128 At 991 (per Young j). 
129 Re Kailis Groote Eylandt Fisheries Pty Ltd [1977] 2 ACLR 574. 
130 Re Buildmat (Australia) Pty Ltd (1981) CLC 40-714. 
131  See Grace 1986 ICLQ 689, citing in support Banque des Marchands de Moscou v 
Kindersley [1951] 1 Ch 112 and Re Azoff-Don Commercial Bank [1954] Ch 315. 
132  Lee supra n 94. 
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(b) Discretion to refuse a petition 
 
The granting of an order following a winding-up petition is said to involve the 
exercise of a court’s discretionary powers. This is firmly established in local law, 
following the decision in Tong Aik.133 In this instance, an appeal was brought to 
the Federal Court in Singapore against the decision of the High Court refusing 
to make an order for the winding-up of the Eastern Minerals & Trading (1959) 
Ltd company. The appellant was unable to obtain payment of a judgment debt 
and evidence to support the contention that the company was unable to pay its 
debts appeared in an affidavit sworn by one of the respondent’s directors. The 
company was incorporated under the Companies Ordinance of the States of 
Malaya and had its registered office in the state of Kelantan. Although it had 
maintained a place of business in Singapore, by the time of the petition it had 
notified the Registrar of Companies that it had ceased to maintain its place of 
business. It was thus considered an unregistered company and fell to be wound 
up under the appropriate rules in Singapore.134 Evidence was nevertheless 
available to the court suggesting that the company’s sole activity was carrying 
out mining in Kelantan and that the company had minimal assets in Singapore, 
although there were substantial outstanding liabilities. The court’s view was that 
the effect of an order made by a Singapore court was necessarily limited to 
assets present within the jurisdiction and no useful purpose would be served if 
there were indeed no assets present. That fact was sufficient in itself to deny 
the appeal, although the court also noted that there was nothing to prevent a 
petition being brought in the States of Malaya and that the relevant companies 
enactment provided for the due administration of assets. Furthermore, the 
companies enactment contained a reciprocal provision allowing a winding-up 
order made by one jurisdiction to be acted on in the other without the necessity 
for formal winding-up proceedings to be opened.135
                                            
133  Tong Aik (Far East) Ltd v Eastern Minerals Trading (1959) [1965] 2 MLJ 149. 
134  S 295, Companies Ordinance (Cap 174) (Singapore). 
135  See below in section 5.3. 
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(c) Forum non-conveniens/Lis alibi pendens 
 
Although rarely invoked in the context of insolvency proceedings, a plea of 
forum non conveniens or lis alibi pendens may be raised where litigation is 
already in contemplation or has been initiated on an issue which will be affected 
by the onset of insolvency proceedings, especially where the rules of 
insolvency proceedings prevent the determination of issues, including the fate 
of priorities, set-offs, and dispositions of assets, except by application of 
insolvency principles. This may result in great detriment to an individual creditor 
in comparison to the benefit available for all creditors as a class. This is of 
particular relevance where the court is petitioned to open winding-up 
proceedings in respect of a foreign company on just and equitable grounds.136
The Malaysian and Singapore views on the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
are broadly similar to that in English law, where it is a relatively recent 
development.
  
 
137 Under previous common law rules, a stay of action would only 
be granted in cases of vexation or oppression.138 The basic principle is that a 
stay will only be granted where the court is satisfied that there is another 
available forum that is the appropriate forum for trial and that the case may be 
tried more suitably in that forum in the interest of all the parties and of justice. 
The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that there is another forum that 
is more appropriate than the English forum. Factors to be taken into account 
include with which country the action has the most real and substantial 
connection, the law governing the relevant transaction, the place where the 
parties reside or carry on business and questions of convenience and expense, 
although it is not enough to show that the plaintiff will obtain a personal or legal 
advantage by the action remaining within the jurisdiction.139
                                            
136  Grace supra n 131 at 689 (n 230 cites as authority Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150). 
137  The Atlantic Star [1974] AC 436. 
138  Logan v Bank of Scotland (No 2) [1906] 1 KB 141. 
139  Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex [1987] AC 480. The position in Malaysia and Singapore 
is broadly analogous to the English rules. 
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5 Mutual assistance measures: co-operation with foreign courts 
The move away from statutory jurisdiction of the ancillary type to more complex 
co-operation measures seems to have been initiated largely because of the 
perceived inadequacy of submitting a foreign company to domestic jurisdiction 
without necessarily involving the consent of the jurisdiction of origin. The 
development of the doctrine of comity, requiring courts to have regard for the 
decisions given by courts of comparable status and to enforce them, further 
stimulated progressed towards co-operation by inviting courts to make contact 
with each other and to develop working relationships, so as to be able to 
ascertain what outcome was feasible within the context of proceedings 
involving matters of joint concern. Furthermore, the development and 
expansion of corporate rescue measures meant that ancillary jurisdiction, 
geared as it was towards the liquidation of assets, was inadequate to deal with 
the problems of the preservation and continuing exploitation of assets 
necessary for ensuring the survival of businesses in financial difficulties. In 
these instances, co-operation was vital to allow corporate rescue measures to 
have effect. Co-operation measures have a long history and are known in a 
number of jurisdictions from about the middle of the 19th century. In this context, 
it may be noted that the development of co-operation provisions occurred 
initially within the field of bankruptcy, where perhaps the need was first felt. This 
has influenced, in many jurisdictions, the adoption of comparable measures to 
assist corporate debtors. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The history of the provision is largely that of the development of co-operation 
measures in the context of the bankruptcy of individuals. There is in fact a long 
tradition in the common law of courts extending aid for the collection of assets 
located in the jurisdiction of the courts and that belong to foreign debtors.140
                                            
140  Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 Hy Bl 131n; 126 ER 79. See Nadelmann 1947 ModLR 154; 
Lipstein 1949 ModLR 454. For an extensive survey of this development, see Blom-Cooper 
1954 ICLQ 604, 1955 ICLQ 1 and 170 (part 1, 2 and 3). 
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The precept of assistance, first located within the law of bankruptcy, derives 
from the doctrine relating to the law of personality or movable property, by 
which personal assets were deemed to have no locality but were subject to the 
law governing the person of the owner.141 There were difficulties, however, in 
relation to persons who had not committed acts of bankruptcy within the 
jurisdiction.142 Furthermore, the situation of real property was one where the 
courts often declined to assume jurisdiction, holding that the proper law was 
that of the location.143 Nevertheless, the opening of proceedings involving 
foreign debtors began to be a regular feature in the case-law, although the 
courts were not always inclined to give effect to foreign judgments in all 
cases.144
The first appearance of a statutory formula can be traced to 19th century 
provisions on enforcement of orders given by courts within the United Kingdom 
and a requirement of assistance to other British courts, perhaps embodied in 
bankruptcy legislation as a response to the growing numbers of insolvencies of 
persons and partnerships affecting assets located in a number of 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.
 Nonetheless, the common law development of assistance in 
bankruptcy began to give way to statutory formulations incorporating an 
assistance doctrine. 
 
145
                                            
141  Sill v Worswick (1781) 1 H Bl 665, 690 (per Lord Loughborough). 
142  See Topham 1903 LQR 295. 
143  British South Africa Company v Companhia de Mocambique [1893] AC 602; Re Trepca 
Mines [1960] 3 All ER 304. 
144  Tharsis v La Société des Métaux (1889) 58 LJ QB 435; Gibbs and Sons v Société 
Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399. 
145  S 220, Bankruptcy Act 1849 (UK); s 73-74, Bankruptcy Act 1869 (UK); s 117-118, 
Bankruptcy Act 1883 (UK). See Graham 1989 CLP 217, 225 and Galbraith v Grimshaw 
[1910] AC 508 for a cross-border instance (England-Scotland) under the Bankruptcy Act 
1883 (UK). 
 Interestingly, the 1849 Act, which was a 
Consolidation Act embodying an update of bankruptcy law, contained a section 
75 that stated that the filing of a bankruptcy petition and adjudication of an act 
of insolvency in India was to be treated as conclusive evidence of an act of 
bankruptcy for proceedings in England. Although the definition of Indian 
territory did not appear to extend to other colonies or settlements then ruled 
from India, including the Straits Settlements, a further section 239 did provide 
that copies of petitions (including vesting orders, schedule of debts, 
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adjudication and other orders) that were issued in Calcutta, Madras and 
Bombay (collectively known as the Presidency Towns) as well as in the Prince 
of Wales Island (now known as Penang), Singapore and Malacca were to be 
treated as acceptable evidence before English courts of a foreign bankruptcy. 
This is the first mention of the extension to territory that is now comprised within 
Malaysia and Singapore of a recognition provision. The successor 1861 Act 
extended the remit of section 75 of the 1849 Act, coincidentally re-enacted as 
section 75 of the 1861 Act, to provide that the filing of a petition or adjudication 
of an act of insolvency in any court (including that of a colony, dominion or 
dependency) was now to be treated as conclusive evidence of an act of 
bankruptcy for proceedings in England. A further section 218 allows for 
petitions or orders in bankruptcy to be used directly as the basis of new 
adjudications of bankruptcy in England. Although section 239 of the 1849 Act 
becomes section 206 of the 1861 Act with no substantial change in wording, 
new sections 208 and 220 articulate what becomes known as the auxiliary 
doctrine, the first stating that courts in London and districts would be auxiliary 
for the purposes of administering oaths on affidavits or declarations, while other 
courts (in Scotland, Ireland or a colony, dominion or dependency) were able to 
take judicial notice of same, the second provision enabling courts in London 
and districts to be auxiliary for purposes of proofs of debt, examinations on oath 
“or for other like purposes” to other courts elsewhere. 
 
The 1869 Act states in rather florid language a wording that has been used as 
the basis of subsequent co-operation provisions. In section 74:  
 
The London Bankruptcy Court, the local Bankruptcy Court, the 
Courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy in Scotland and Ireland, and 
every British Court elsewhere having jurisdiction in bankruptcy or 
insolvency, and the officers of such Courts respectively, shall 
severally act in aid of and be auxiliary to each other in “all matters of 
bankruptcy”, and an order of the Court seeking aid, together with a 
request to another of the said Courts, shall be deemed sufficient to 
enable the latter Court to exercise, in regard to the matters directed 
by such order, the like jurisdiction which the Court which made the 
request, as well as the Court to which the request is made, could 
exercise in regard to similar matters within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
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This appears to permit full co-operation for bankruptcy matters between courts 
within the Empire (now Commonwealth) without distinction. However, the 
expansive language of the section required interpretation and an early case 
qualified the courts included within the definition by emphasising that the scope 
of the law was limited to courts that had jurisdiction in bankruptcy.146
Nevertheless, an early instance of their use saw a British court give effect to a 
pooling arrangement for creditors of a firm pursuant to a request from an Indian 
court despite the lack of express provision in the successor 1883 Act to give 
effect to such a scheme.
  
 
147 It is also in the 1883 Act that the language changes 
slightly to reflect alteration to the internal court system in England, section 118 
referring to “The High Court, the County Courts…”. In fact, David Graham QC 
states that in the wake of the 1883 Act, the problem of bankruptcy co-operation 
within the British Empire had “taken centre stage” with “several draft bills”, 
prepared by the Board of Trade (now Department of Trade and Industry) and a 
former Chief Justice of Australia being submitted to the Imperial Conference 
(the predecessor to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting) in 
1887. No progress was, however, made.148
The provisions of this act were designed to co-ordinate proceedings and 
enabled the courts within the Commonwealth to request other courts to assist in 
the management of bankruptcy proceedings within their own jurisdiction. The 
making of an order seeking the aid of another court was deemed sufficient 
authority to enable the other court to exercise the jurisdiction it would if the 
matter were before it for consideration. The use of the word 'British' as part of 
the definition prompted enquiries in the United Kingdom in a number of cases 
as to whether particular courts were included.
 As a result, the 1883 provision 
ends up simply consolidated as section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914.  
 
149
                                            
146  Callender Sykes v Colonial Secretary of Lagos [1891] AC 460. 
147  Re P. MacFadyen, ex parte Vizianagaram [1908] 1 KB 675. 
148  See Graham 2001 IIR 153, 159. 
149  Re Maundy Gregory (1934) 103 LJ Ch 267 (Jerusalem District Court included); Re 
Osborne [1931-32] B&CR 189 (Manx Court included); Re James [1977] 1 All ER 364 
(post-UDI Rhodesian courts excluded); Re A Debtor [1981] Ch 384 (Jersey Court 
included). 
 The same enquiry was put 
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before a number of Commonwealth courts as to whether they fell within the 
definition.150 Furthermore, the remit and purpose of the section were 
considered in Re A Debtor,151 in which it was held that the definition of 
'bankruptcy' referred to the judicial process dealing with insolvent persons and 
was to be construed in a wide sense as the section was designed to produce 
co-operation between courts acting under different systems of law. Once an 
English court was satisfied the request for aid fell within the ambit of the 
provision, there was no general duty to scrutinise anterior proceedings unless it 
could be shown that they were defective under the proper law of the court or 
that they offended against public policy, thus setting a favourable trend for co-
operation measures. This did not mean, however, that courts would not set 
conditions on the assistance given, particularly where there were interests 
within the jurisdiction that could potentially come into conflict.152
Particular difficulties exist where the foreign bankruptcy contains a sizeable 
revenue debt.
  
 
153
                                            
150  Contra: Re Graham [1928] 4 DLR 375 (Saskatchewan); Pro: Re Nall (1899) 20 NSWR 25, 
Re Greenaway (1910) WN (NSW) 112 (New South Wales); Re Fogarty (1904) QWN 67 
(Queensland) and see Clunies-Ross v Totterdell (1988) 98 ALR 245, where the Australian 
court held that the definition applied to the Cocos Keeling Islands for the purpose of 
assistance to an Australian court. 
151  Re A Debtor (ex parte the Viscount of the Royal Court of Jersey) [1980] 3 All ER 665. 
152  Re Osborne [1931-32] 15 B&CR 189; Re Jackson (1973) NILR 67. See also Re Gibbons 
(1960) Irish Jurist 60, where discretion was exercised against granting aid under the 
equivalent Irish provision: s.71, Bankruptcy (Ireland) Act 1872. 
153  Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 491. 
 As the nations constituting the Commonwealth became 
responsible for their own legislation, a situation given effective recognition by 
the Statute of Westminster 1931, the efficacy of judicial assistance depended 
wholly on courts recognising the similarities of the procedures each system 
evolved to deal with insolvency practice within their own jurisdiction. As noted 
earlier, the Bankruptcy Act 1883 and its successor consolidation legislation, the 
Bankruptcy Act 1914, were exported to a number of Commonwealth countries, 
including Malaysia and Singapore, incidentally ensuring the survival of the co-
operation provision in these and other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
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5.2 Bankruptcy 
In Malaysia, the successor provision is now contained within bankruptcy 
legislation and deals with the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
bankruptcy judgments and orders of other countries. The reconsolidation of 
bankruptcy law in Singapore in 1995 saw the re-enactment of the 
corresponding provision with some textual amendments.154 The sections are 
principally designed to ensure close cooperation between Singapore and 
Malaysian courts, given the close historical links between the two countries as 
they permit the mutual recognition of acts by the Official Assignee without 
further formality.155 The sections permit the High Court of each jurisdiction to 
act in aid of and be auxiliary to the courts of the other jurisdiction as well as the 
courts of any other designated country with jurisdiction in bankruptcy and 
insolvency matters, provided that these courts are required to act in aid of and 
be auxiliary to the courts in either Malaysia or Singapore.156 Countries may be 
designated by the respective authorities through notification in the official 
Gazette of Malaysia or Singapore.157An order of any such court seeking aid 
through a request to the High Court is deemed sufficient to allow the High Court 
to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the matter. This jurisdiction may be that 
which the High Court or the other court could exercise in comparable matters 
within their respective jurisdictions.158 One notable difference between the 
legislation in Malaysia and Singapore is the inclusion in the Malaysian Act of an 
extra sub-section stating that any discretion exercised by the High Court in 
matters of aid must have regard to the rules of private international law.159
                                            
154  S 104, BAM; s 151, BAS. 
155  For a working example, see Amos William Dawe v Development and Commercial Bank 
[1981] MLJ 230. 
156  S 104(1), BAM; s 151(1), BAS. The use of the words 'bankruptcy and insolvency' in both 
texts suggest, if the ordinary meaning of the words are followed, that corporate insolvency 
is included in the definition, although s 121, BAM excludes the possibility of receiving 
orders being made against companies and the language of s 104(3)-(6), BAM only speaks 
of the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy, leading one to assume a contrario that it was not 
intended that companies should be covered by this provision. 
157  S 104(7), BAM; s 151(3), BAS. 
158  S 104(2), BAM; s 151(2), BAS. 
159  S 104(2A), BAM. 
 In 
relation to the work of the Official Assignee, the provisions in Malaysia and 
Singapore require notification in the Gazette that the respective Governments 
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have entered into an agreement for the mutual recognition of each other’s 
Official Assignee.160 Recognition would automatically allow property in any 
jurisdiction to be vested in the Official Assignee appointed in the other 
jurisdiction where proceedings have been opened in respect of the debtor in 
that other jurisdiction.161 An exception is made for property in any jurisdiction 
where there are pending proceedings in that jurisdiction until and unless those 
proceedings have been withdrawn or dismissed.162 To facilitate recognition, the 
production by courts in either jurisdiction of an order of bankruptcy is deemed 
conclusive proof in the courts in the other jurisdiction of the order having been 
made.163 Furthermore, the Official Assignees of either jurisdiction may sue in 
their own titles in the courts of the other jurisdiction.164 The way in which these 
provisions are stated is very similar to other comparable successor provisions, 
including the Australian and the British.165 However, the comparative lack of 
case-law suggests that the provision is little known or invoked in the context of 
cross-border insolvency. This may well explain the absence of any legislative or 
political pressure to improve its use or, as in both Australia and the United 
Kingdom, to extend the model to situations of corporate insolvency.166 Despite 
this, one commentator in Malaysia has advocated, for the reason that bankrupt 
parties are known to leave the jurisdiction rather than face judgment, that other 
countries, especially member states of ASEAN, be gazetted as designated 
countries for the purposes of section 104 and that consideration also be given 
to extending its use to corporate insolvency matters.167
                                            
160  S 104(3), BAM; s 152(1), BAS. 
161  S 104(4), BAM; s 152(2), BAS. 
162  S 104(4), BAM; s 152(3), BAS. 
163  S 104(5), BAM; s 152(4), BAS. 
164  S 104(6), BAM; s 152(5), BAS. 
165  S 29, Bankruptcy Act 1966 and s 426, Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) respectively. 
166  The s 29 model has been extended through its enactment mutatis mutandis in s 581, CAA, 
while the s 426 model, following the recommendations of the Report of the Review 
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, applies to both personal and corporate 
insolvency. 
 Furthermore, what is 
interesting is that, as will be seen immediately below, at one time there was a 
co-operation model in corporate insolvency in Malaysia and Singapore. 
 
 
167  See Bte Abdullah http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/ 31 Aug. 
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5.3 Corporate Insolvency 
Part XIII of the former Companies Ordinance, one of the predecessors to the 
Companies Acts of both Malaysia and Singapore, contained provisions by 
which a winding-up order made by one of the jurisdictions over a company 
incorporated in that jurisdiction had effect in the other jurisdiction without the 
necessity for formal winding-up proceedings.168 These provisions were stated 
as applying on the basis of reciprocity and would allow for Official Receivers or 
other officials appointed in either jurisdiction to act in the other without further 
formality.169 Courts would be able to take judicial notice of authenticating 
documents issued under the seal of signatures of court officials in the other 
jurisdiction.170 The powers contained in the provisions were expressed as being 
in addition to any other remedies created by legislation or made available by 
the courts.171 The courts were empowered to transmit winding-up orders to the 
other court for action and aid in enforcing the order through the making of an 
ancillary winding-up order.172 Nevertheless, creditors were still permitted to 
apply for a stay before the ancillary order was given.173 The effect of an 
ancillary order was to render any attachment, distress or execution against the 
assets of the company void.174 No further action or proceeding would be 
permitted to commence or proceed without the leave of the court.175
                                            
168  Part XIII, s 342-356, Malayan Union Companies Ordinance 1946 (MU 13 of 1946) 
(hereafter CO). The consolidated text reflected both the position in the Malayan Union and 
the Straits Settlements, of which Singapore was a part, contained in the case of the latter 
in the Companies Ordinance 1940 (SS 49 of 1940). 
169  S 342, CO. 
170  S 343, CO. Similar treatment was accorded to a record of evidence taken by the other 
court under s 356, CO. 
171  S 344, CO. 
172  S 345, CO. Applications could also be made for the opening of ancillary proceedings under 
s 353, CO. Power was also given for the appointment of a provisional ancillary liquidator 
under s 355, CO in anticipation of a request being made. 
173  S 346, CO. 
174  S 347, CO. 
175  S 349, CO. 
 The 
Official Receiver in the jurisdiction where the ancillary order was made would 
assume the role of an ancillary liquidator and may exercise all the powers of the 
Official Receiver to take possession of property, get in and realise assets, carry 
on the business of the company, pay claims and take proceedings on behalf of 
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the company.176 The courts also enjoyed the power to compel discovery and 
information about the affairs of the company.177 The courts were also 
empowered to transmit cases between the principal and ancillary jurisdiction for 
the determination of a particular issue.178
6 International developments 
 Unfortunately, these reciprocal 
provisions did not survive the redrafting of legislation, perhaps because it was 
felt that the statutory jurisdiction model outlined in the previous section was 
adequate to deal with the phenomenon of ancillary proceedings in the case of a 
foreign company. Nevertheless, they are a useful example of an early type of 
co-operation provision, albeit limited to a bilateral model, as they only applied to 
relations between Malaysia and Singapore.  
 
 
6.1 UNCITRAL Model Law 
Malaysia and Singapore have not been immune to global tides of recession that 
have had a damaging effect on the economies of both nations. Interest has 
been growing in the effective management of economic problems, including 
whether the appropriate mechanisms exist in domestic law to deal with the 
impact on domestic companies of financial difficulties. An international project 
in which there has been some interest in the region is the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997.179 Approval was given by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997 in a resolution noting 
that the inadequate co-ordination and co-operation existing in cases of cross-
border insolvency reduced the possibility of rescuing viable businesses and 
impedes the proper and efficient conduct of proceedings resulting in a 
significant disadvantage for creditors and employees. The text of the resolution 
goes on to recommend that member-states review their insolvency legislation 
and give favourable consideration to enacting the Model Law.180
                                            
176  S 350, CO. 
177  S 351, CO. 
178  S 352, CO. 
 The Model 
179  UNCITRAL Model Law http://www.uncitral.org/ 31 Aug (hereafter ‘Model Law’). 
180  UN Res No 52/158 http://www.un.org/ 31 Aug. 
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Law contains four key areas outlining the scope of the Model Law itself and 
rules for access by representatives of foreign insolvency proceedings, including 
those governing the treatment of foreign creditors. It also covers the effects of 
domestic recognition of foreign procedures and, most importantly, rules for co-
operation and for co-ordination of simultaneous proceedings in several 
jurisdictions over the same debtor. The text represents essentially a 
compromise between different legislative traditions and is accompanied by a 
Guide to Enactment, which was produced in order to assist legislative 
draftsmen in adapting the Model Law to local conditions.  
 
Till now, the Model Law has been adopted by a growing number of countries,181 
indicating the potential interest it may have for Malaysia and Singapore. A 
number of other countries are known to be considering the Model Law for 
adoption, including Australia and Canada, while other countries in ASEAN 
reported to be favourable include Thailand.182 Although Malaysia has 
expressed an interest in the overall conclusion of the text,183 the more recent 
activity of the Companies Commission of Malaysia and its proposals for reform, 
although mentioning the interest that the issue of cross-border insolvency may 
have in its review of core company law, has not expressly declared that the 
topic is to be treated as part of the review.184 This also seems to be the position 
taken by the Singapore Companies Legislation and Regulatory Framework 
Committee, which reported in 2002, but did not recommended the adoption of 
the Model Law, preferring to wait to see how the impact in “major common law 
jurisdictions” will be felt.185
                                            
181  These include the British Virgin Islands, Colombia, Eritrea, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Poland, Romania, Montenegro, Serbia, South Africa, the UK and the USA (see UNCITRAL 
 It thus remains to be seen whether a sufficient 
number of the nations with whom Malaysia and Singapore have strong trading 
links will adopt the text, thus making a stronger case for both nations to do so. 
Nonetheless, there are developments occurring in the regional context, dealt 
http://www.un.org/ 31 Aug. 
182  According to Stewart “UNCITRAL Model Law". 
183  See Omar http://www.undp.org/ 31 Aug (site no longer available). 
184  CCM supra n 17 at 26. 
185  Lee supra n 94 at 331, citing par 1.3 in ch 4 of the report. 
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with below, that may push the agenda for the adoption of the Model Law proper 
or a tailored version for local consumption.  
 
 
6.2 The Asian Development Bank Initiative 
The Asian Development Bank, covering the region in which both Malaysia and 
Singapore are located, initiated a project in providing regional technical 
assistance for the updating of insolvency laws of its member states.186 This 
project was carried out through the law and development initiative of the bank 
and is intended to provide a regional forum for government officials and 
interested parties to discuss insolvency problems and exchange ideas on 
reform and best practice. A study was carried out into the relationship between 
corporate debt and recovery and corporate insolvency in eleven Asian 
economies, which reported in 1999. Part of the comparison involved identifying 
areas of similarity and differences and, in light of this, developing key areas for 
evaluation as well as a model for best practice, on which reforms might be 
attempted. The project was accompanied by technical aid for reform projects 
the participating Governments wished to carry out. In the wake of this initiative, 
two later reports, also commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, have 
formed the basis on which specific recommendations were made for dealing 
with cross-border insolvency issues. The first, produced in 2000,187 set out 
good practice standards in insolvency law to be used as part of any reform 
strategy. Good Practice Standard number 16 states that provision should be 
made within the context of any reforms for cross-border insolvency, the 
preference being that this could be achieved through the adoption of the Model 
Law. A later 2005 report takes this recommendation further by providing two 
draft texts by which this goal could be achieved.188
                                            
186  Based on material available at Insolvency Asia 
 The first of these takes the 
form of a regional treaty incorporating the features of the Model Law, while the 
second is in the form of a statement of some twenty agreed principles, which 
form part of a scheme for regional cooperation in cross-border insolvency 
http://www.insolvencyasia.com/ 21 Aug. 
187  ADB Office of the General Council http://www.adb.org 31 Aug. 
188  ADB Blake Dawson Waldron and PwC http://www.adb.org 31 Aug. 
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matters.189
7 Summary 
 Thus far, neither Malaysia nor Singapore appear to have acted on 
the content of these proposals and it remains to be seen whether sufficient 
interest will be shown by client states of the Asian Development Bank in taking 
these projects further. 
 
 
The rise of international commerce and the ease of setting up in more than one 
jurisdiction now mean that many companies have little difficulty in gearing their 
economic expansion to a global scale. Just as expansion has brought 
considerations of conflicts of law and choice of law in international contracts 
and litigation, so too the periodic downturns in the world economy have brought 
considerations of private international law rules in relation to insolvencies. 
Insolvencies with an international dimension raise a number of important 
issues, including the diversity of laws which are potentially applicable to the 
transactions of a single company and which have important consequences at 
the time of insolvency. This phenomenon has induced courts to begin to co-
operate with each other, realising that insolvency can have far-reaching 
consequences on society and economies, both local and foreign. With the 
number of international insolvencies likely to increase, as a function of periodic 
decline in the world economy, this spirit of co-operation can only be positive. 
The trend in many countries has been to seek to deal with insolvencies 
containing an international element by exercising exorbitant or ancillary 
jurisdiction, depending to which of the territorial or universal models of 
insolvency that country subscribes.  
 
In Malaysia and Singapore, despite the incremental growth of cross-border 
trade and transactions, neither jurisdiction appears to have the necessary 
legislative tools to be able to properly exercise control over cross-border 
insolvencies. In Singapore, commentators state that the law does not as yet 
appear sufficiently comprehensive to deal with the complicated nature of cross-
                                            
189  See Wessels Cross-Border Insolvency Law 54-55 and 991-1009. 
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border questions arising in the course of the insolvency of foreign companies. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness of the need to amend the law 
before these problems are aggravated.190
                                            
190  Cooper and Jarvis supra n 41 at 103; Lee supra n 94 at 330-331. 
 The same case could be made for 
Malaysia, where a great number of foreign companies operate and where the 
insolvency of some of these companies is a statistical possibility. In both 
jurisdictions, there is a strong case for legislative action to take place at an 
early opportunity during a periodic review of the framework for company and 
insolvency law. This review is particularly urgent in the case of Malaysia where 
companies’ legislation dates from 1965 and, although the subject of occasional 
though minor amendments, would benefit from the wholesale revision that now 
appears to be the subject of the initiative by the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia. In light of the work that is being carried out in the region by 
international bodies operating in the financial sector, it seems likely that 
insolvency law and its cross-border aspect will at some point become a priority 
for law reform initiatives in both countries. This would seem especially cogent 
and necessary given that the framework for international insolvency has been 
considerable advanced by the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency 1997, a text of immense utility that has now been adopted by 
a significant number of the trading partners of both these jurisdictions. 
Arguably, the incorporation of its provisions within any revision that is carried 
out in these jurisdictions or the adoption of one of the Asian Development 
Bank’s recommended models (regional treaty or scheme) would do much to 
advance the recognition of the inevitable cross-border dimension to insolvency 
law today. 
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